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DAFYDD FELL
Was 2005 a Critical Election in Taiwan?
Locating the Start of a New Political Era
ABSTRACT
This study applies the concept of critical elections to Taiwan’s recent political history. 
Instead of 2008, it is argued that 2005 deserves the title of a critical election. Politi-
cal developments in 2005 laid the foundations for the Kuomintang’s return to politi-
cal dominance. 
KEYWORDS:  critical elections, Taiwan, political parties, Kuomintang, Democratic 
Progressive Party
THE START OF A NEW POLITICAL ERA:  2008?
Taiwan’s second democratic change of ruling parties, in 2008, appears to 
mark the start of a new era in its political history. After eight long years in 
opposition, the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT) returned to power 
on the back of landslide victories in both parliamentary (Legislative Yuan) 
and presidential elections. +ese elections gave the party both vote and 
seat share advantages last seen in the late 1980s, when Taiwan was just 
emerging from four decades of authoritarian rule. Under the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), supporters of the KMT had become increasingly 
disillusioned with Taiwan’s political institutions. Slogans such as “Democ-
racy is Dead” or “+e Judiciary is Dead” were commonly seen at KMT 
demonstrations.1
+e KMT’s recent victories have served to revive its supporters’ damaged 
trust in Taiwanese democracy and have also improved the image of Taiwan’s 
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1. Sta2 reporter, “Chen Replies to Pan Blue Rally Request,” Taipei Times, March 28, 2004, p. 1.
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democracy in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).2 On the other hand, 
the degree of KMT political dominance in the aftermath of these elections 
and the way it has handled demonstrations have led some critics to warn of 
the dangers of a return to a new authoritarian era.3 +e frequent argument 
that 2008 marks the start of a new era is also reinforced by the warming of 
cross-Taiwan Strait relations after an e2ective political stalemate since 1995. 
A key task for political analysts is to make complex political processes 
comprehensible to their readers. One way that we achieve this objective is to 
classify political eras and examine patterns of change and continuity across 
time. +erefore, in this study I attempt to locate the starting point of Tai-
wan’s new political era. At 3rst blush, it appears that 2008 should be re-
garded as a turning point, or what political scientists refer to as a “critical 
election.” Critical elections are de3ned by Evans and Norris as, “+ose ex-
ceptional contests which produce abrupt, signi3cant and durable realign-
ments in the electorate with major consequences for the long-term party 
order.”4 Election and survey data are examined to analyze the changing party 
order in Taiwan. However, here it must be pointed out that the study’s re-
sults can only be considered preliminary: at least two more electoral cycles 
are required to determine whether we have witnessed a durable realignment. 
+is study can only show whether the 2005 contest has the potential to be a 
critical election. 
I argue that although 2008 does have some of the hallmarks of a water-
shed year, the data suggest that 2005 has a much better claim to be potentially 
the critical election. +e critical shifts in public opinion that laid the founda-
tions for the KMT victories occurred in 2005. Here, the key political devel-
opments of 2005 are examined to show the role they played in ending the 
DPP era. Although political pundits tend to regard KMT o4cials’ visits to 
the PRC in the spring of 2005 as the most momentous political events of 
that year, I argue that other developments were more signi3cant. +e KMT’s 
e2ective ownership of the anti-corruption issue and the new party leadership 
both contributed to decisive shifts in party support levels in late 2005.
2. References in the Chinese media to Taiwan’s democracy have become far less critical since 
2008.
3. For instance, DPP Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen has made this argument. See “Tsai Calls for 
Police Calm during Protest,” Taipei Times, May 17, 2009, p. 1. 
4. Geo2rey Evans and Pippa Norris, eds., Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-
term Perspective (London: Sage, 1998), p. xxxi.
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In addition, institutional developments that year also make it a turning 
point. +e constitutional reforms of the electoral system—so in5uential in 
giving the KMT overwhelming majorities in 2008—were passed in 2005. In 
addition, that year KMT primaries began to contribute to a coalescing of 
Pan Blue parties, as splinter party politicians returned to join the KMT 
nomination process.5 +is meant that by 2008 there was e2ectively only a 
single Pan Blue party, for the 3rst time since the early 1990s. 
CRITICAL ELECTIONS
Critical elections are actually extremely rare in mature democracies, where 
continuity, or what political scientists call “maintaining elections,” tend to 
predominate.6 +is is where elections essentially re5ect a continuation of the 
status quo in party competition. An intermediate type of election is referred 
to as a “deviating election.” +is is where there is a temporary shift in the 
normal share of votes for the main parties, perhaps through the impact of 
political scandals, short-term issues, or signi3cant events. However, after this 
short-term deviation, there is a return to the old pattern of party politics in 
the subsequent election. As Evans and Norris put it, the deviating election is 
one that leaves “no permanent imprint on the party system.”7 
+e other major categories of realignment in the party literature attempt 
to capture the phenomenon of long-term change. Secular dealignment refers 
to a long-term gradual loosening of voter-party ties.8 +is is closely associated 
with the “party in crisis” argument that the weakening of the class cleavage in 
West European democracies has not been replaced by new cleavages that tie 
social groups to parties. +e other long-term change category is known as 
secular realignment. +is describes how party allegiances shift because of 
generational change or new issue cleavages.9 
5. +e Pan Blue camp refers to the KMT and its splinter parties, such as the People First Party 
(PFP) and New Party (NP), while the Pan Green parties are the DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU). +ese colors are used because blue and green are the main colors of the KMT and DPP 
5ags, respectively. 
6. Evans and Norris, Critical Elections, p. xxxii.
7. Ibid., p. xxxiii.
8. Pippa Norris, $e Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Marketplace (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 230. 
9. Vladimer Orlando Key, Jr., “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” Journal of Politics 
21:2 (May 1959), pp. 198–210. 
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Although a maintaining election is straightforward to recognize, consider-
able time is required before we can be certain whether an election is perma-
nently or just temporarily transforming the political system. +e concept of 
critical elections becomes clearer if we think in terms of actual cases in modern 
democracies. In the case of the U.K., the most frequently cited example of a 
critical election is New Labour’s coming to power in 1997.10 Labour had been 
in opposition for almost 20 years, losing four consecutive general elections. 
But under the leadership of Tony Blair, the party recovered and dominated 
the political scene for well over a decade by winning a series of elections. In 
fact, until recently it appeared that Labour was likely to be the governing 
party for the foreseeable future. 
CRITICAL ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN
After two decades of multi-party politics in Taiwan, can we talk of any criti-
cal elections there? Each of Taiwan’s major elections has had its own unique 
feature. +e 1986 contest was the 3rst multi-party election;11 1991 and 1992 
were the 3rst full parliamentary elections.12 In 1995 the NP’s strong showing 
implied the start of a multi-party system; 1996 was the 3rst direct presiden-
tial election; and in 1997 the DPP’s vote and seat share exceeded the KMT’s 
for the 3rst time. Nevertheless, John Hsieh is correct in his assertion that 
rather than change, there was far more continuity in the 3rst era of multi-
party elections in Taiwan.13 Unlike most other formerly authoritarian parties 
after a democratic transition, the KMT was able to remain in power by con-
tinuing to win national elections. 
Now I turn to election and survey data in my search for Taiwan’s critical 
elections. Table 1 shows the party vote shares from Taiwan’s 3rst four presiden-
tial elections. With only four direct presidential elections held so far, these 
results cannot be considered conclusive. +e KMT’s defeat in 2000 looks like 
a deviating election, with the party returning to its original vote share of 
10. A similar case is the long-term Conservative Party’s domination of British politics after its 
1979 election victory. 
11. Although the DPP was still technically an illegal organization, the KMT regime did not 
crack down on this challenger party that year. 
12. +e 3rst full National Assembly elections were in 1991, while 1992 featured the 3rst full 
Legislative Yuan elections. 
13. See John Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” in How Asia Votes, 
eds. John Hsieh and David Newman (New York: Chatham House, 2002), pp. 32–49.
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approximately 50% in 2004. +ere are signs that suggest 2008 is a candidate 
for a critical election: this was the 3rst time the DPP vote share fell, with the 
KMT’s rising almost another 10% to its highest-ever level of 58.45%.
Next, Tables 2 and 3 show the main parties’ respective vote and seat 
shares in Legislative Yuan elections. Here the patterns are more complex: 
table 1. Party Vote Shares in Presidential Elections (%)
1996 2000 2004 2008
KMT 54 23.1 49.9 58.45
DPP 21.1 39.3 50.1 41.55
NP 14.9  0.1
PFP 36.8
source: Online database of the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, at <http://vote.
nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp?pass1=A>, accessed December 10, 2009.
table 2. Vote Shares in Parliamentary (Legislative Yuan) Elections (%)
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008
KMT 53 46.1 46.4 28.6 32.8 51.2
DPP 31 33.2 29.6 33.4 35.7 36.9
NP 13.0  7.1  2.9  0.1  4
PFP 18.6 13.9 
TSU  8.5  7.8  3.5
source: Ibid. to Table 1, at <http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp?pass1=B>, accessed December 10, 
2009.
note: These figures show the vote shares for the main political parties in legislative elections.
table 3. Party Seat Shares in Parliamentary (Legislative Yuan) Elections (%)
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008
KMT 59 51.8 54.7 30.2 35.1 71.7
DPP 31.7 32.9 31.1 38.7 39.6 24
NP 12.8  4.9  0.4  0.4  0
PFP 20.2 15.1  0.9
TSU  5.8  5.3  0
source: Ibid. to Table 2. 
note: These figures show the seat shares for the main political parties in legislative elections.
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the multiple member district electoral system o2ered more space for third 
parties than did the single-member presidential elections shown in Table 1. 
Although in some cases there are disparities in the vote and seat shares that 
parties received, three contests stand out as potential critical elections: 1995, 
2001, and 2008. 
First, 1995 was the 3rst election in which a third party, the NP, passed the 
threshold of becoming relevant in both seat and vote shares. +is set a pat-
tern in which at least three parties were competing in legislative elections, a 
pattern that was maintained until 2008. Nevertheless, the weakness of 1995 
as a critical election lies in the NP’s subsequent decline in its second national 
level election in 1998. +us, the success of the NP in the mid-1990s can per-
haps be seen as a deviating election: by the late 1990s there was a return to 
two-party competition after the NP bubble burst. 
+e second potential critical election is 2001. +is year was signi3cant 
because of the arrival of two new parties, the TSU and the PFP and the total 
demise of the NP. +is election saw record KMT losses in both seat and 
vote share, largely in favor of the PFP. In fact, at the time it even looked 
possible that the PFP might replace the KMT as the largest party in the Pan 
Blue camp. Moreover, in 2001 the DPP became the single largest party for 
the 3rst time. +e patterns of party competition in 2001 were largely main-
tained three years later in 2004. 
Nevertheless, the case for 2000–01 as a critical election is diminished by 
the transformation in the Taiwanese party system seen in the 2008 legislative 
elections, the 3rst under the new single-member-district electoral system.14 
First, the KMT recorded its highest ever vote and seat share increases. +e 
seat share changes were especially dramatic as the KMT’s total rose from 
about one-third of the seats in 2004 to almost three-quarters of all seats in 
2008. +e DPP’s vote share was relatively stable, but the party su2ered its 
3rst and worst ever fall in seat share: from being the largest parliamentary 
party with almost 40% of the seats, it was relegated to becoming a small-to-
medium sized party with just one-quarter of the seats in 2008. +e third major 
shift that year was the virtual disappearance of the challenger parties, making 
Taiwan a two-party system of one large (KMT) and one small-to-medium 
party (DPP). In short, these parliamentary results suggest that after a series 
14. In 2005, constitutional revisions were passed that halved the number of legislators from 225 
to 113 and moved from a predominantly multiple-member-district system to one of mainly single-
member districts. 
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of deviating elections, 2008 could mark a return to the patterns of party 
competition last seen at the outset of democratization in the late 1980s. 
+e last set of electoral data examined is for the island-wide single-member-
district local executive elections, which is displayed in Table 4. +ese were 
held for city mayors and county magistrates and took place every four years 
in the 23 cities and counties (except Taipei and Kaohsiung City). As with the 
parliamentary statistics, these data suggest that the recent pattern of political 
competition is returning to a situation rather similar to the early 1990s. After 
a period of multi-party competition from the mid-1990s to 2004, Taiwan 
was moving back toward a two-party system after 2005. +e local executive 
contest that stands out is 2005—the year that the KMT had its largest in-
crease in seat and vote shares and the DPP its record seat share loss. In fact, 
the DPP’s local executive seat share in 2005 was almost exactly the same as 
its 2008 parliamentary seat share, approximately one-quarter of all seats. In 
other words, 2005 set a precedent for a return to KMT one-party domi-
nance, a pattern repeated at the national level in 2008. +erefore, this table 
suggests that the critical election or year marking a watershed between political 
eras is 2005 rather than 2008. 
In December 2009, the most recent round of local executive elections was 
held. However, as a result of administrative mergers and upgrading, the elec-
tions for a number of key constituencies were postponed until 2010.15 +is 
15. Taipei County was upgraded to a special municipality to be called New Taipei City; the three 
merged districts are Kaohsiung City and County, Tainan City and County, and Taichung City and 
County.
table 4. Local Executive (Vote Share and Seat) (%)
1993 1997 2001 2005 2009
KMT 47.3 (61.9) 42.1 (34.8) 35.2 (39.1) 51 (60.9) 47.9 (70.6)
DPP 41.2 (28.6) 43.3 (52.2) 45.3 (39.1) 42 (26.1) 45.3 (23.5)
NP  3.1 (0)  1.4 (0)  9.9 (4.3)  0.2 (4.3)
PFP  2.4 (8.7)  1.1 (4.3)
TSU  1.1 (0)
sources: Ibid. to Table 3, at <http://www2.nccu.edu.tw/~s00/eng/data/data01.htm>, accessed December 
10, 2009. The 2009 figures are from the Central Election Commission’s website, <http://vote2009.nat.gov.
tw/zh_TW/PC/00000000000.html>, accessed December 10, 2009.
note: This table shows the main parties’ vote and seat shares in local executive elections. The party seat 
shares are shown in parenthesis. While in 2005, 23 local executives were elected, in 2009, because of admin-
istrative district changes, only 17 local executive posts were elected.
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meant that only 17 counties and cities elected local executives in 2009, rep-
resenting only about 40% of Taiwan’s total population. +erefore, although 
I have included the vote and seat shares for 2009 in Table 4, this is not com-
paring like for like.
Nevertheless, these elections did represent the 3rst island-wide expression 
of public opinion after the KMT returned to power; they were widely re-
ferred to in the media as the “mid-term exam” of President Ma Ying-jeou.16 
Although there was a swing in the vote shares from KMT to DPP, the fact 
that the KMT won 12 out of 17 districts suggests that the pattern of KMT 
dominance, set in 2005, has continued. +at the KMT would view winning 
almost three-quarters of available seats and the loss of just one seat as a defeat 
is reminiscent of its reaction to minor setbacks at the outset of multi-party 
politics in the late 1980s.17 In other words, although the 2009 data are not 
conclusive, continued KMT dominance does support the argument that 
2005 can be considered a potential critical election. 
Examining only election data has its drawbacks when trying to locate 
watersheds between eras. First, elections are not held every year; thus, key 
developments between elections may be missed. Second, elections held at 
di2erent levels and under di2erent electoral systems cannot be easily com-
pared. +erefore, I also look at developments in party identi3cation surveys, 
shown in Table 5, which are conducted more frequently. +ese show some 
similarity to the election data. For instance, there was a shift toward a multi-
party system with the arrival of the NP in the mid-1990s. As with the elec-
tion data, 2000 seems to mark the start of a new era, with a halving of the 
number of KMT supporters and the transfer of their support to the PFP. +e 
danger that the KMT would be replaced as the dominant Pan Blue party can 
be seen from the fact that in 2000 and 2001, the PFP’s support levels were 
actually higher than the KMT’s. On the other hand, change for the DPP 
occurred more within the pattern of secular realignment, with a very steady 
year-on-year increase in its support levels from just 5% in 1994 to a high of 
26.6% in 2000. 
16. Li Ming-hsien, “Lan: Diyu 11xi Jiu Baixuan” [Blues: Lower than 11 seats is a defeat], Lianhe-
bao [United Daily News], December 5, 2009, p. A1. 
17. On the KMT’s negative verdict on its performance in the 2009 local elections, see Shih 
Hsiu-chuan and Ko Shu-ling, “KMT Caucus Apologizes for Poll Results,” Taipei Times, December 
8, 2009, p. 3. +e KMT viewed these results as disappointing because most seats contested were safe 
KMT districts with KMT incumbents, and Ma’s stumping for the party’s candidates failed to pre-
vent signi3cant vote swings toward the DPP. 
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Nevertheless, as in the local executive elections, the year that stands out in 
the party identi3cation surveys as a watershed is 2005. +is year saw the big-
gest single year-on-year rise in party identi3cation for the KMT, from 21.9% 
to 33.2%. Although the decline in PFP support contributed to this rise, it is 
likely that some independents (i.e., non-partisans) also shifted allegiance 
to the KMT. +is year was also important because it represents the 3rst 
signi3cant fall in support for the DPP from 26% to 20%. Although most 
of these former DPP supporters would likely have become independents, 
it is at least possible that some may have crossed the divide and become 
KMT identi3ers.
+e importance of 2005 is also reinforced by the fact that it was followed 
for the next four years by relative consistency in party support levels. Surpris-
ingly, it appears that dramatic events such as the Red Shirts Anti-Corruption 
Movement of 2006, the DPP’s more radical nationalist appeals in the last 
two years of the Chen Shui-bian administration, and even the KMT’s land-
slide victories and return to power in 2008 all had relatively minimal long-
term impacts on party support levels.18 In short, the survey data also support 
the case for 2005 being a potential critical election year. 
EXPLAINING THE 2005 CRITICAL SHIFT  IN PUBLIC OPINION
If we accept that the roots of the 2008 landslides lie in the political develop-
ments of 2005, then the next step is to try to unravel what contributed to 
this critical shift in public opinion. +erefore, I next review some of the key 
potential developments in 2005 that could help explain this shift. Because 
political scientists working on Taiwan mainly concentrate on issues related 
to national identity/cross-strait relations, this seems to be the 3rst 3eld to 
consider. 
+e political event that captured the most media attention in 2005 was of 
course the April visit by KMT Chairman Lien Chan to China, where for the 
3rst time since the 1940s, party-to-party talks were conducted between the 
KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). +ese talks saw a range of 
18. +e Red Shirts Anti-Corruption campaign was a large social movement that emerged in the 
autumn of 2006 calling on Chen Shui-bian to resign the presidency. In the last two years of Chen’s 
second term, the DPP increasingly courted its core supporters with Taiwanese nationalist appeals. 
For instance, it scrapped the National Uni3cation Guidelines in 2006 and renamed the Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall as the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall in 2007. 
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agreements signed by KMT and CCP leaders. Also agreed was a framework 
for future consultation and meetings that have continued to the present, 
even after the KMT became the ruling party.
+ere is no doubt that these talks did help to ease cross-strait tensions and 
laid the foundation for the de facto government-to-government talks held 
since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008. Previously, there was concern 
that voters would react negatively to party-to-party talks and condemn the 
KMT as being uni3cationist or defeatist. Nevertheless, what was surprising 
was that the talks were relatively well received by Taiwanese public opinion, 
with over 50% of respondents judging the visit a success and helpful for 
cross-strait relations.19 
Although there is a correlation between the new détente with the CCP 
and the KMT’s growing popularity, there is no clear evidence that this in5u-
enced the public opinion shifts of 2005. +e DPP did try to condemn the 
KMT as defeatist in 2005, but such issues were not salient in the local execu-
tive election campaign, which was dominated by corruption scandals. More-
over, we should recall that the agreements were signed by Lien at the end of 
his term as KMT chair; subsequently, although the agreements were not 
scrapped, Ma, the new KMT leader, kept a degree of distance from the 
KMT-CCP forum. For instance, he did not repeat Lien’s comments on ally-
ing with the CCP against Taiwan independence; nor did Ma visit China 
under the title of KMT chairman during his two years in that role.
We can also con3rm the lack of a clear relationship between the KMT’s 
China visits and the shift in public opinion, by examining party identi3ca-
tion polls conducted between 2004 and 2005. Table 6 shows that there was 
no clear shift in party support levels following Lien’s April trip to China; 
although the KMT did see an increase of support between April and May, so 
did the DPP. Instead the table reveals that KMT support doubled in the last 
six months of 2005, and DPP support was halved in the last four months of 
the year. In other words, this table does not o2er any evidence of a direct 
public opinion bene3t from the China visits. However, it does suggest that 
the answer to the puzzle lies in the last quarter of the year. 
Another commonly heard interlinked argument designed to explain the 
DPP’s fall and KMT’s rise was that Taiwan’s voters rejected the DPP’s radical 
19. TVBS Survey Center Poll, “Survey after Lien Chan’s Mainland China Visit,” May 2, 2005, 
<http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/rickliu/200505/rickliu-20050505142339.pdf >, accessed 
December 10, 2009. 
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independence policies. For instance, Robert Ross argued in 2006 that 
“[p]olitical developments in Taiwan over the past year (2005) have e2ectively 
ended the independence movement there.”20 He goes on to claim that main-
land policy was a major issue in the 2005 elections and that “voters opted for 
cross-Strait stability” of the KMT rather than the DPP’s extremism. +is 
does seem to have some resonance when we consider portions of the rhetoric 
of Chen Shui-bian and his ministers in their second term. 
+e 3rst problem with this argument is that the DPP only really went 
to extremes in the last two years of its term, 2006 and 2007. For instance, 
the move to scrap the National Uni3cation Guidelines and National Uni-
3cation Council occurred in 2006 and the anti-Chiang Kai-shek appeals, 
along with the policy of renaming state-owned enterprises to use the term 
“Taiwan,” were in 2007.21 We need to remember that the major shift in 
public opinion occurred in 2005. In that year, the DPP actually took a 
rather moderate stance on national identity issues. For instance, in February, 
President Chen and Pan Blue leader Soong Chu-yu signed a joint 10-point 
agreement that included support for the Republic of China.22 Moreover, 
an analysis of both main parties’ election advertising in 2005 shows issues 
related to Taiwan independence or identity received minimal attention. 
20. Robert Ross, “Taiwan’s Fading Independence Movement,” Foreign A%airs 85:2 (March-April 
2006), pp. 141–48, 141.
21. In its last two years, the DPP administration actively tried to rename state-owned enterprises. 
For instance, Chunghwa Post became Taiwan Post in 2007. 
22. Sta2 reporter, “Chen and Soong Sign 10-Point Consensus,” Taipei Times, February 25, 2005, 
p. 1. It was agreed that the Republic of China would remain the nation’s o4cial title. 
table 6. Party Identi3cation, 2004–2005 (%)
 Apr.
2004
   Jul.
2004
Feb. 2, 
2005
Mar. 30, 
2005
Apr. 28, 
2005
May 23, 
2005
Aug. 24,
2005
Dec. 15,
2005
DPP 23 23 26 24 18 23 21 12
KMT 21 16 23 23 24 31 32 47
PFP 10 10  7  8  5  5  4  3
TSU  2  5  4  4  4  4  4  3
Indep. 40 41 36 37 45 33 37 31
source: TVBS Poll Center, “Survey on the Nine Main Political Figures after the Three in One (December 
2005) Elections,” <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/200512/yijung-20051216190351.pdf>, 
accessed December 10, 2009.
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Instead, both parties concentrated on candidate appeal and accused each 
other of corruption.23 
THE POLITICAL CORRUPTION ISSUE AND THE MA YING-JEOU FACTOR
+e evidence that the political corruption issue played a more signi3cant role 
in the public opinion shifts of late 2005 is far more convincing than explana-
tions focusing on cross-strait relations or national identity. Political corrup-
tion has been one of the most salient issues in Taiwanese politics since the 
early 1990s. It was critical in the DPP’s expansion of its support base and in 
eroding KMT support in the 1990s.24 Voters had traditionally associated po-
litical corruption with the KMT, and critiquing such behavior had long been 
a key weapon for Taiwan’s opposition parties, including the DPP and the 
NP. Even after the DPP became the ruling party, it still owned the clean 
government issue and continued to employ it against the KMT.25 Although 
the KMT, after it lost power in 2000, began to place more emphasis on at-
tacking the DPP for corruption, these appeals had limited e2ect prior to 
2005 because the DPP still maintained a relatively clean image compared to 
the KMT. For instance, in the 2004 presidential campaign Chen came under 
attack for receiving illegal donations, but these attacks appeared to have little 
impact on the election result.26 +e degree to which the DPP still owned the 
anti-corruption issue can be seen in Table 7, which shows the proportion of 
voters that viewed the parties as free of corruption between 1999 and 2008. 
+e table shows that until mid-2005, voters still tended to view the KMT as 
being more corrupt than the DPP. 
+e major shift in party image on the corruption issue occurred in late 
2005: within a few months, the proportion of voters viewing the DPP as being 
23. +is point is based on the author’s examination of newspaper election advertising one month 
prior to voting day in December 2005. 
24. For an analysis of the political corruption issue in Taiwan’s electoral politics, see Dafydd Fell, 
Party Politics in Taiwan: Party Politics and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan, 1991–2004 (London: 
Routledge, 2005), pp. 55–84. 
25. In the 3rst two parliamentary elections after 2000, political corruption was the DPP’s sixth 
most-emphasized issue area. See Dafydd Fell, “Change and Continuity in Taiwanese Party Politics 
since 2000,” in What Has Changed? Taiwan before and after the Change in Ruling Parties, eds. Dafydd 
Fell, Henning Kloeter, and Chang Bi-yu (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 2005), pp. 21–40, 31. 
26. In the 2004 presidential election, a former pro-KMT fugitive business leader issued a series of 
corruption-related attacks against Chen Shui-bian in the 3nal weeks of the campaign. For instance, see 
newspaper advertisement in Zhongguo Shibao (China Times) (Taipei), March 2, 2004, p. A9. 
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free from corruption declined from 34% to 17%, while those viewing the KMT 
as clean rose from 32% to 47%. Moreover, the timing of this shift in party 
image corresponds exactly with the shift in party support levels in late 2005. 
+is can be explained by the string of corruption scandals that emerged in late 
2005 and dominated the agenda throughout the 3nal months of the campaign. 
+e allegations that were particularly damaging for the DPP were related to 
corruption in the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) construction project 
and also to high-level DPP involvement in stock market insider trading.27 +e 
former deputy secretary-general of the Presidential O4ce, Chen Che-nan, was 
the focus of the Kaohsiung MRT scandal, and so this indirectly implicated 
President Chen. Chen Che-nan had proclaimed his innocence, but pictures of 
him and the former head of Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Corporation in a casino 
in South Korea were used by the KMT as ammunition against the DPP.28 Al-
though Chen Che-nan was expelled from the DPP, the scandal seriously tar-
nished the image of the party.
After the defeat, DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui explained, “In this election, 
for every county and city candidate it was a battle between Chen Che-nan 
and Ma Ying-jeou.”29 +e KMT revealed its emphasis on anti-corruption in its 
advertising and campaign rallies, where it was the dominant issue. For in-
stance, the party’s main pre-election rally was called the “Oppose Corruption 
Save Taiwan, All People Rally.”30 +is was in stark contrast to many previous 
27. Ko Shu-ling, “KMT Crushes DPP in Landslide Victory,” Taipei Times, December 4, 2005, 
p. 1.
28. See KMT newspaper election advertisement, Zhongguo Shibao, November 10, 2005, p. A8.
29. Lianhebao, December 4, 2005, p. A14. 
30. KMT advertisement in ibid., November 26, 2005, p. A1.
table 7. Party Image of Clean Government (%)
Nov. 
1999
Mar.
2001
Mar.
2002
Aug.
2004
May
2005
Sept.
2005
Nov.
2005
Jul.
2006
Oct.
2007
Jan.
2008
Sept.
2009
KMT 21 22 27 31 30 34 29 40 29 38 31
DPP 47 41 48 38 34 31 17 14 21 23 21
sources: Ibid. to Table 6, “Survey on Party Image and the Chen Shui-bian Case on the First Anni-
versary of Ma’s Inauguration,” <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/200905/ 
doshouldo-20090508114757.pdf>, accessed December 10, 2009. Source for 2009 figures is ibid., “Party 
Image Survey on the DPP’s 23rd Anniversary,” <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/200909/
yijung-20090929184421.pdf>, accessed December 10, 2009. 
note: This table shows the proportion of voters that viewed the main parties as being free of corruption.
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elections, where the KMT had tried to steer clear of the corruption issue. 
One of Taiwan’s leading political scientists, Wu Yu-shan, summed up the 
impact of the issue in 2005, writing that “[c]orruption brought down the 
Green Camp’s Domain.”31
Of course, the anti-corruption issue could only bene3t the KMT if it 
improved its own reputation. At the time the KMT lost power in 2000, only 
21% of respondents saw it as a clean party, compared to 47% for the DPP. 
Nevertheless, Table 7 shows that between 2001 and 2005, the KMT’s reputa-
tion gradually improved. It was only in late 2005 that—for the 3rst time—
the KMT had a cleaner reputation than the DPP; it has maintained this 
advantage up to the present writing. +e KMT was able to improve its image 
despite the fact that the DPP tried to use the corruption issue throughout 
this period.32 Moreover, there is no evidence that KMT local executives 
were any less corrupt than their DPP counterparts: candidates from both 
parties had pending corruption cases. Instead, it was the parties’ contrasting 
national-level image of corruption that would override local party or can-
didate images. 
How was the KMT able to transform its image? Four key factors contrib-
uted to this development. First, with most local executive positions and the 
national government in DPP hands, there was far less scope for the KMT to 
indulge in or be accused of corruption. By 2005, memories of the KMT’s 
numerous corruption scandals of the 1990s had faded signi3cantly. Second, 
since the KMT partly attributed its poor reputation to its fall from power in 
2000, o4cials undertook some organizational reforms to try to erase the 
party’s corrupt image. In particular, they reformed nomination regulations 
to avoid nominating tainted candidates.33 A third major factor was the elec-
tion of Ma Ying-jeou as KMT party chairman in July 2005. Ma was one of 
the few KMT politicians seen as corruption free, a reputation he initially 
cultivated by cracking down on KMT vote buying when he was minister of 
justice in the early-to-mid-1990s. In 2005, as in 1998, with Ma fronting the 
party, accusations of KMT corruption were less e2ective.34 
31. Wu Yu-shan, “Tanfu Yakuale Lüying Bantu” (Corruption brought down the Green Camp 
domain), Zhongguo Shibao, December 4, 2005, p. A15.
32. Fell, “Change and Continuity in Taiwanese Party Politics,” p. 31. 
33. Dafydd Fell, “Democratization of Candidate Selection in Taiwanese Political Parties,” Journal 
of Electoral Studies 13:2 (November 2006), pp. 167–98, 181. 
34. In 1998, Ma was the KMT’s candidate for Taipei mayor. Despite heavy NP and DPP corrup-
tion attacks, the KMT won its best legislative results of the decade. 
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Table 7 shows that the election of Ma as KMT chairman did not have an 
immediate impact on improving the party’s reputation. +is may be partly 
because the DPP made corruption accusations against the KMT in the 2005 
campaign. Nevertheless, under Ma, for the two years prior to its 2008 land-
slide victories, 37%–38% of voters viewed it as a clean party. +ese are quite 
remarkable 3gures compared to the image of the party under Ma’s predeces-
sors, Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan. 
Ma’s election as KMT chair in the summer of 2005 was a key moment in 
the party’s revival. When we are considering the shift of public opinion in 
2005 in favor of the KMT, we must also stress the importance of Ma’s popu-
larity. Ma was able to appeal to core Pan Blue voters but also to the many 
non-aligned independent voters. Surveys of public satisfaction with Tai-
wan’s leading politicians during the DPP era show that Ma was consistently 
by far the most popular politician.35 For instance, in a public satisfaction 
survey in December 2005, Ma had a satisfaction level of 80%, with his near-
est rival almost 20% lower at 62% and Chen at an all-time low of only 10% 
of voters.36 Ma also had political communication skills far superior to his 
predecessor, Lien Chan. Although this was particularly evident in his cam-
paigning in the run-up to the 2008 elections, Ma did invigorate the 2005 
campaign. He campaigned throughout the island for KMT candidates. At 
times the KMT tried to frame the election as a referendum on Ma’s leader-
ship. For instance, on the eve of the election, Ma threatened to resign his 
chairmanship if the party failed to win half the seats. One half-page KMT 
newspaper advertisement showed a solemn Ma and the slogan: “Don’t let 
Ma Ying-jeou disappear from political circles.”37 Undoubtedly, being led by 
Taiwan’s most popular politician helped invigorate the KMT base and also 
appealed to critical swing voters, who would determine the national-level 
election in 2008. 
35. TVBS Poll Center, “Sanheyi Xuanju hou Guonei Jiuda Zhengzhi Renwu Shengwang Dia-
ocha” [Survey on the popularity of the nation’s nine main politicians after the three in one election] 
(2005), December 12–15, 2005, <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung/200512/
yijung-20051216190351.pdf>, accessed December 9, 2009; idem, “Reputations of 10 Taiwanese Major 
Political Figures,” January 7–8, 2009, <http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/yijung200905/
yijung-20090508145805.pdf>, accessed December 9, 2009. 
36. Chen did eventually beat that level in 2009, when he had a satisfaction level of 6%. 
37. KMT newspaper advertisement in Zhongguo Shibao, December 3, 2005, p. A10. 
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INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES  IN 2005
When we look for answers to why the KMT won in 2008, changes in public 
opinion can only tell us part of the story. +ere are also institutional vari-
ables that can support the contention that 2005 was the critical turning 
point. First, in 2005 the KMT’s primary elections began to contribute to-
ward a Pan Blue merger. Since the early 1990s, the Pan Blue camp had suf-
fered from severe divisions, both via rebel KMT candidates such as Soong 
Chu-yu in 2000, and through splinter parties that split the KMT vote, such 
as the NP and PFP.38 A key factor in the divided Pan Blue camp was its use 
of authoritarian nomination methods in the 1990s. +e KMT returned to 
using primaries in 2001, which reduced the number of rebel candidates sig-
ni3cantly. However, in 2005 a new precedent for Pan Blue unity was set in 
the primaries for Taipei County, whereby a number of PFP politicians re-
turned to the KMT to join its primary process. +e eventual winner was one 
of these former PFP politicians who then went on to win the Taipei County 
seat, a district that the DPP had held since 1989. +is kind of Pan Blue pri-
mary was held on a far greater scale in the run-up to the 2008 elections, so 
that on the eve of the election there was e2ectively only a single Pan Blue 
Party, the KMT. 
+e second key institutional reason for viewing 2005 as a critical year was 
the constitutional reform of the electoral system that was passed that year. 
+is meant that, as noted previously, the number of legislators was halved 
from 225 to 113; the former single vote multiple member district system was 
replaced with a single member district two-vote system.39 +ese changes only 
came into e2ect for the 2008 legislative elections, but looking at Tables 2 and 
3 above we can see how the new system was disastrous for all parties except 
the KMT. +e KMT did increase its vote share from 32.8% to 51.2%, but its 
seat share doubled from 35.1% to almost three-quarters of the seats. In con-
trast, the DPP’s vote share actually rose slightly from 35.7% to 36.9%, but its 
38. +e way rebel candidates and splinter parties split the Pan Blue vote and led to defeat is evident 
in Tables 1–3 above. For instance, Soong’s candidacy in 2000 meant that although the combined Pan 
Blue vote was almost 60%, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian won with 39%.
39. Under the Legislative Yuan electoral system prior to 2005, voters cast one vote for a candi-
date in multiple member districts. After 2005, voters cast two votes, one for a candidate in a single 
member district and one for their preferred party. +ere are 73 single member districts, six aborigi-
nal seats, and 34 seats given to parties according to the proportion of votes received on the second 
ballot. 
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seat share plummeted from being the largest party, with 39.6% of seats to 
only 24%. In other words, the system moved from being highly proportional 
to one that not only o2ered no space for small parties but was highly dispro-
portional and clearly favored one party. 
Two examples can illustrate how the KMT bene3ted under the new sys-
tem. First, certain KMT strongholds with small voter constituencies retained 
their seats relatively unchanged. For instance, the o2shore islands, Taitung 
in the southeast, and aboriginal districts have always been dominated by Pan 
Blue parties, but these districts were not a2ected by the reforms.40 +e KMT 
candidate won in Lienchiang with just 2,182 votes, while in other districts 
100,000 votes were required to win election. +is meant that the KMT in 
e2ect had a 10-seat head start. 
A second case that illustrates the impact of the new system and changed 
political environment is Yilan County in northeastern Taiwan. In 2004, this 
was a three-seat district in which the DPP won two seats and, as a result of 
a Pan Blue splinter party candidate, the KMT won just one. Under the new 
electoral system, Yilan became a one-seat constituency. +e Pan Blue party 
merger since 2005 and shift in party support levels meant that the KMT was 
able to win this single seat in 2008, and the DPP candidate lost despite re-
ceiving over 81,000 votes. Perhaps the greatest mistake of the DPP during 
the Chen era was promoting this constitutional reform. Although some DPP 
3gures such as Lin Cho-shui had warned that this would be disastrous, Chen 
was convinced by his presidential victory in 2004 that the DPP could win a 
majority under the new system.41 Instead, the new system appears to make 
long-term KMT parliamentary majorities more likely. 
CONCLUSIONS
+is essay has applied the concept of critical elections to Taiwan’s recent 
political history. It has shown that there is more evidence to suggest that 
2005, rather than 2008, should be regarded as the watershed or potential 
critical election. +at year saw the decisive shift in public opinion away from 
40. Districts like Lienchiang, Taitung, Penghu, and Jinmen remained unchanged, while the 
aboriginal districts only dropped from eight seats to six. In legislative elections since 1989, the DPP 
had only ever held one seat out of these districts, an aboriginal seat in 2004. 
41. Lin Wei-ren, “Xuanzheng Jiagou yu Guohui Xinmao” [Election structure and the new face 
of Parliament], Lianhebao, May 15, 2005, p. A15. 
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the DPP toward the KMT. It also saw important institutional developments 
such as reforms to Taiwan’s electoral system and KMT primaries that facili-
tated a merger of Pan Blue parties. +e fact that public opinion since 2005 
has been stable and subsequent electoral results have followed the pattern set 
at that time together highlight the long-term signi3cance of that year. Simi-
larly, the 2005 reforms of the electoral system look likely to continue aiding 
the KMT in future parliamentary contests. Naturally, it is too early to reach 
a de3nite conclusion as to whether 2005 was a critical election: that verdict 
will require at least two more electoral cycles. For the time being, it can only 
remain a potential critical election. 
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